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PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND CLINICAL

FREEDOM
ChristopherNewdick*

In the rationing debate, the language of rights has not served us well.
We disagree as to what should count as "health;" 1 what care is "necessary;" whether "need" should be measured according to individual or
public considerations;3 whether ethics or economics should form the essential basis on which resources should be allocated;4 and whether democracy provides a fair and reasonable way of resolving these matters.5
As one commentator has put it, "[t]he debate about priorities will never
be finally resolved. As medical technology, the economic and demographic environment, and social attitudes change, so almost certainly will
our priorities. '"6 In this environment of uncertainty, how should the debate about justice in the allocation of health care resources proceed?
We are unlikely to discover a universal theory on which substantive
* Mr. Newdick is a Reader in Health Law at the University of Reading in the United
Kingdom. This Article retains British spelling and citation form in many places.
1. See, e.g., K.W.M. FULFORD, MORAL THEORY AND MEDICAL PRACTICE (CUP,
1989); David Callahan, The WHO Definition of "Health", in T. BEAUCHAMP & L. WAL-

49 (1982); and E. Campbell, J.Scadding & R.
Robertn, The Concept of Disease, 2 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 757 (1979).
2. See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurer's Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1640-41 (1992); and Wendy Mariner, Patient's Rights
After Lfealth Care Reform: Who Decides What is Medically Necessary? 84 AM. J. OF PUB.
TERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS

HEALTH 1515, 1516 (1994).
3. CHRISTOPHER NEWDICK, WHO SHOULD WE TREAT?
SOURCES IN THE NHS 19-36 (1995).

LAW, PATIENTS AND RE-

Norman Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems, 24 HASTINGS
4. See, e.g.,
CENTE;:

REPORT

27 (1994); G.

MOONEY, ECONOMICS, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE

(1992); A. McGUIRE, P. FENN & K. MAYHEW EDS., PROVIDING HEALTH CARE: THE ECONOMICS OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF DELIVERY (1991); and J. Avron, Benefit and Cost

Analysis in GeriatricCare: Turning Age Discriminationinto Health Policy, 310 NEW

ENG.

J. MEE,. 1294 (1984).

5. See, e.g., W. John Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, and
the Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR. L. REV. 47 (1993); D. HUNTER,
RATIONING DILEMMAS IN HEALTH CARE (National Association of Health Authorities and
Trusts, 1993).
6. R. Klein, Dimensions of Rationing: Who should do what?, RATIONING IN ACTION
103 (1993).
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rights to health care can be based. Instead, we need to improve our understanding of the systems in which health care is delivered in order to
develop appropriate procedures for reassuring patients that those systems
are serving their interests reasonably and responsibly. This Article discusses the future of clinical freedom and the Hippocratic oath; experiments with systems of management in the National Health Service
("NHS") in the United Kingdom; systems of accountability in health
care; and the notions of solidarity, trust, and confidence amongst patients.

I.

THE FUTURE OF CLINICAL FREEDOM AND THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH

Traditionally, the relationship between doctor and patient has been
based on the Hippocratic ideal, which commits the doctor "[to] follow
that system of regimen ...I consider for the benefit of my patients, and
abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous." 7 The nature of
this commitment has been described as follows:
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the patient and to no one else. He is not the agent of society, nor of
the interests of medical science, nor of the patient's family, nor
of his co-sufferers, or future sufferers from the same disease.
The patient alone counts when he is under the physician's care.
By the simple law of bilateral contract.., the physician is bound
not to let any other interest interfere with that of the patient in
being cured. But manifestly more sublime norms than contractual ones are involved. We may speak of a sacred trust; strictly
by its terms, the doctor is, as it were, alone with his patient and
God.8
From this, is it plausible to argue that doctors should consider themselves
immune from the pressures imposed by scarce resources? Must they re7. See BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL ETHICS TODAY, appdx. 1 (1993).

8. HANS JONAS, PhilosophicalReflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 417 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds., Wadsworth
Publishing Co., 1978). Quoted in T. BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING 35 (Calif. Univ. Press,
1991). The American Medical Association considers that "[it is unethical to knowingly
provide unnecessary care or be wasteful in providing needed care: [Nevertheless], [w]hile
this responsibility to guard society's resources is an important one, physicians must remain
primarily dedicated to the health care needs of their individual patients." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Managed Care,
273 JAMA 330, 332 (1995). Similarly, the General Medical Council in the U.K. says that
"a doctor should always seek to give priority to the investigation and treatment of patients
solely on the basis of clinical need." GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN HEALTH CARE:
CLINICAL NEEDS para.8

(1992).

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN RELATION
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gard their duty as absolute, imposing an ethical obligation to do only
what they consider as best for the patient, regardless of the consequences
to others of doing so? Or is the Oath no more than an ideal, or an "ideal
type,"" which we might recognise as a model for analysis, but not as the
basis of a binding professional ethic? The following section suggests that
the absolute view of the Hippocratic oath cannot be the salient ingredient
of the doctor's duties in matters of resource allocation.' ° It considers the
decline of clinical freedom and the relevance of the claim that doctors
owe fiduciary duties to patients.
A.

The Decline of Clinical Freedom

Surprisingly, it is difficult to find in any of the medical literature a sustained examination of the nature of the liberty that resides in the notion
of clinical freedom. Some have described its limitations, but not its central core. 1 Others, including doctors, have ridiculed the whole idea as an
improper cloak behind which doctors have hidden decisions of questionable value, particularly in relation to resource allocation. 2 What is the
nature of this "freedom" within the science and art of medicine, and what
value ought we attach to it?
No one seriously contends that the notion of clinical freedom confers
absolute liberty on doctors with respect to the treatment they offer, or fail
to offer, to their patients. "Freedom" in this context may be understood
by comparison to the discretion given to administrative officials. It is exercised within a framework of values created by statute and common
9. "Ideal types" seek to characterise ways of thinking as aids to analysis. They do not

put any prescriptive value on "type" under consideration. See
MAX

WEBER,

ch.2 (1983); and H.H.

ANTHONY

T. KRONMAN,

GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER,

ch.8

(1970).
10. See Irvine Loudon, The Hippocratic Oath, 309 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 414
(1994). "1have searched for but failed to find even a shred of evidence that the oath was
admini,tered anywhere at any time." See also Eugene Robin & Robert McCauley, Cultural Lag and the HippocraticOath, 345 THE LANCET 1422 (1995); and Spyros Marketos et
al., The Hippocratic Oath, 347 THE LANCET 101 (1996).
11. One extended consideration of the theme concentrates on the qualifications to the
notion, for example confidentiality. R. HOFFENBURG, CLINICAL FREEDOM (1987).
12. M. COOPER, RATIONING HEALTH CARE 75 (1975). "The clinical freedom to differ
widely as to their conception of need has led to inconsistencies of treatment between patients and to the allocation without challenge, of scarce resources to medical practices of
no proven value. It is by no means clear that it is the patient who gains from clinical freedom." See also J. Hampton, The End of Clinical Freedom, 287 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1237

(1983); and T.

FOLMER ANDERSON & GAVIN MOONEY EDS., THE CHALLENGE

OF MEDICAL PRACTICE VARIATIONS

ch.2 (1990).
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law.1 3 Thus, such discretion may be described as weak, or strong, depending on the latitude created by the enabling powers, and thereby accommodates the possibility of differences of opinion between decision
makers.14 In this respect, doctors have traditionally been accorded a
broad measure of discretion in the treatment of their patients. Naturally,
the arguments surrounding the risks and benefits of particular courses of
action, or inaction, were inconclusive and the courts were often illequipped to judge amongst them. Recent trends, however, suggest an
increased degree of supervision of doctors. In England, a series of cases
since 1992 have taken a more critical view of clinical discretion, not with a
presumption for or against the doctor, but to test the decision in question
against a logical framework of the risks and benefits of treatment. This
"hard look" 15 approach has introduced a closer degree of managerial and
judicial supervision than hitherto.
In addition, developments in the field of information technology have
enabled the different clinical practices of doctors to be evaluated according to their relative costs and efficacy. Some oppose the use of the word
"science" to describe what has become known as "evidence-based
medicine,"" nevertheless the influence it gives to those whose job it is to
manage groups of doctors is enormous.17 Increasingly, doctors will be
expected to justify failures to adhere to the patterns of decision making
adopted by their peers. Their peers will, correspondingly, be encouraged
to follow those patterns that are perceived to generate the best value for
13. The most obvious common law restriction on administrative discretion is that demanded by the rules of natural justice, requiring impartiality on the part of the decision
maker, and the right of those affected to a hearing. See, e.g., Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC
40; Schmidt v Secretary of State [1969] 2 Ch 149; and R v Kent Police Authority ex p
Gooden [1971] 2 QB 662.
14. See D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS-A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL
DISCRETION 14-22 (1986).

15. Culminating in Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771, 779, where
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said "There are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence ... [11f, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not
capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible."
16. See JOHN APPLEBY, KIERAN WALSHE & CHRIS HAM, ACTING ON THE EVIDENCE
(1996); and William Rosenberg & Anna Donald, Evidence Based Medicine: An Approach
to Clinical Problem Solving, 310 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1122 (1995). Doubts about

the objectivity of the evidence at present are expressed by Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes
Assessment in Health Care: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1994).
17. See the assessment of Frances H. Miller, Medical Discipline in the 21st Century:
Are Purchasersthe Answer? (forthcoming, DUKE L.J.); C. VINCENT, M. ENNIS & R. AUDLEY EDS., In Respect of Risk Reduction, MEDICAL ACCIDENTS 80-115 (1993).
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the money. Purchasers of health care (health authorities in the U.K., and
insurers and large employers in the U.S.), rather than clinicians, will inevitably be the dominant influence in this process.
By analogy with the jurisprudence on administrative decision making,
the discretion conferred on individual doctors in this environment is
likely to become relatively weak. Lengths of stay for particular treatments, the procedures to be adopted, the medicines to be used (and not
used), and the intensity of the care provided will be prescribed by guidelines and protocols. Information available to doctors and health service
managers will quickly identify the "outliers," those doctors whose practice lies outside the normal distribution of the group. Of course, doctors
will be reminded that they alone remain responsible for the care of their
patients and that departures from established procedures will be possible
whenever they are justified.' 8 On the other hand, departure from the
standard accepted as normal by the group will increasingly require explanation and, perhaps, adjudication by others. Some doctors may well have
the confidence in their practice and the self-assurance, energy, and time
required to defend himself against a panel of review. In many cases, however, it would not be surprising if others took a less confrontational
route'" and tended to practice in a manner that conformed with group
expeclation. In whatever form this new medical discipline occurs, the nature of clinical freedom in the future will increasingly refer to the freedom to comply with the standards and procedures of large bodies of
other doctors. In this environment, the traditional conception of clinical
"freedom" may appear misleading.
For those who believe that the past practices of doctors were frequently
influenced by considerations of habit, rather than clinical reason,2" and
that the variations of practice between doctors have always been difficult
to explain on any other basis, this change of culture will be welcome.
Indeed, the overall standard of care available to patients in the aggregate
may be expected to rise as a result. Whether or not this is true, there will
18. While accepting the need for guidelines and protocols devised by both doctors and
managers, the American Medical Association says "it remains the physician's duty to ...
advocale for the patient's right to ... treatment in any case in which material benefit to a
particular patient would result." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 8, at
332.

19. See J. Mehang, Letter to the Editor, re The Hassle Factor, 117

ANNALS OF INTER-

797 (1992).
20. See, e.g., J. Burnham, Medical Practice a la Mode: How Medical Fashion Determines Medical Care, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1220 (1987); and T. FOLMER ANDERSON, supra
note 12, at ch.2.
NAL MEDICINE
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be a shift in emphasis in determining what is necessary for patients away
from the judgments of individual doctors. In the future, the Hippocratic
commitment to patients will be assessed by reference to the behaviour of
groups.
B.

Fiduciary Duties to Patients?

Will these pressures turn the doctor's attention away from patients as
his primary focus of concern, and toward the management of resources in
which his first duty will be to the health fund, or employer by whom he is
engaged? Managers have a rather different complex of concerns than
doctors.
In a management culture, individual interests are subordinated to the
whole or collective. "The role is an essentially collectivist one, emphasising strategic planning, establishing the corporate mission and goals of the
organisation.... In contrast, medicine's values stress the individual, the
assumption being that the doctor will work on behalf of the best interests
'
of the individual patient."',
Intuitively, a doctor's commitment of loyalty and trust to the individual
patient has great appeal. If this notion can be sustained, it offers an attractive response to the problem of the aggregation of the doctor's duties
to his patients. The theory of fiduciary duty has been applied to the relationship based largely on the inequality of knowledge between doctor
and patient and the degree to which the patient has to trust the doctor in
weighing the risks and benefits of treatment; and additionally, the decision to recommend non-treatment and suggesting a sensible course of action.22 Indeed, the relationship between doctor and patient may be more
21. D. Hunter, Doctors as Managers: Poachers Turned Gamekeepers, 35

SOCIAL

SCI-

ENCE AND MEDICINE 557, 562 (1992). See also, E. Scrivens, Doctors as Managers:Never the

Twain Shall Meet, 296 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1754 (1988); Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 JOURNAL OF LAW,
MEDICINE AND ETHICS 236 (1995); and, for a more optimistic view of doctors in management, R. Smith, Doctors Becoming Managers, 289 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 311 (1989).
22. The theory of informed consent requires the doctor to disclose material facts that
enable the patient to decide for himself how best to proceed. It would be wrong, however,
to suppose that this removes the doctor from preeminence in the process. Patients may
well want more information prior to treatment, but it would be an usually detached and
impersonal doctor who refused to offer his own advice about the matter. Indeed, given the
inequalities of information between them, the patient will often welcome advice of this
nature. For a discussion of the different styles of "bed-side manner" doctors adopt, see
ROBERT

PART 2

M.

VEATCH, THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATION:

11-15 (1991).

THE PATIENT AS PARTNER,
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close, more dependent, and call for a greater sense of loyalty than many
of the other legal relationships in which a fiduciary duty arises.
The patient seeks treatment or advice from the doctor and as
part of the consultation will disclose intimate personal information. The doctor uses the information to advise and help the patient with his illness or complaint. The patient relies upon the
doctor for help and places his trust in the doctor to act in his
best interests. In doing so the patient exposes himself to the
danger of exploitation and bad faith dealing. The patient is in a
position of vulnerability: he is both trusting and in need of help.
An asymmetry in the relationship exists which stems from the
imbalance in knowledge and power vested in the doctor through
his training and his position as the patient's doctor.2 3
Englisa law is ambivalent as to the existence of a fiduciary duty between
doctor and patient. It accepts the doctrine of fiduciary duties in cases of
undue influence, in which the doctor, or other trusted party, receives gifts
of money or property made by the patient.24 It also fully respects, subject
to overriding public interests, the doctor's duty to respect information
disclosed in confidence.2 5 On the other hand, English law has rejected
the application of a fiduciary duty in matters pertaining to the disclosure
of information necessary to obtain the patient's consent to treatment and
the treatment itself,2 6 perhaps on the grounds that actions for negligent
treatment generally involve no allegation of lack of good faith. Similarly,
when doctors treat patients without obtaining their prior informed consent, the doctor's loyalty may not be in doubt, and the proper course of
23. A. Grubb, The Doctor as Fiduciary, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 311, 313-14

(1994). The author also discusses the Canadian cases of Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 92 DLR
(4th) 449 (doctor made patient's access to medicines dependent on sex); and McInerney v
MacDonald [1992] 93 DLR (4th) 415 (access to medical records at issue). See also Peter
Bartlett, Doctors as Fiduciaries:Equitable Regulation of the Doctor-PatientRelationship 5
MEDICAL LAW REVIEW

193 (1997).

24. See by analogy Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, 423; and Williams v
Johnson [1937] 4 All ER 34 (PC).
25. W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 1089. Arguably, however, this duty arises independently cf a fiduciary obligation from the related contexts of contract, equity, and property.
See Ian Kennedy, The Fiduciary Relationshipand its Application to Doctors and Patients, in
PETER BIRKS ED., WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 122-24

(1996).
26. See Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643, 650-51 per
Lord Scarman, responding to the argument that the relationship between a doctor and
patient is of a fiduciary character: "[t]here is no comparison to be made between the relationshir of a doctor and patient and with that of a solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui
trust or other relationship in equity as of a fiduciary character."
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action sounds in battery. 27 Nor can it discover any fiduciary duty on doc-

tors to explain to the parents of a child who has died under their medical
care the precise circumstances in which the accident occurred. 2' At best,
then, the existence of a fiduciary relationship is heavily dependent on the
facts of each case in which some aspects may, and others may not, be said
to attract such a duty.
In none of these cases, however, has the claim of a fiduciary duty imposed the risk of a serious drain on resources. To what extent, if at all,
can the theory be extended to choices about the nature and quality of the
treatment the doctor should offer his patient? Take, for example,
medicines that are capable of producing marginal benefits, meaning they
may be effective for only a small proportion of those to whom they have
been prescribed. Indeed, for this small group, the benefit may be slight
and of short duration. Thus, the medicines are beneficial, but modestly
so. In another example, consider the patient suffering from a terminal
illness. One product alone presents the chance of improving the quality
(but not the length) of his life; however, the likelihood of its doing so is
around ten percent. In addition, its cost means that, within a fixed
budget, treatments for other patients will have to be delayed or cancelled.29 Were one to ask the doctor whether he would give himself, or a
member of his family, the same treatment, he would probably answer in
the affirmative. What fiduciary relationship, if any, exists in these circumstances? To what extent, if any, does the fiduciary duty oblige the doctor

27. See Grubb, supra note 23, at 323. Loyalty is in issue, however, when the doctor
fails to tell the patient of his inexperience or poor success rate in relation to a particular
procedure. The same is true when other doctors know of a colleague's poor record, but fail
to take action to protect patients from harm. The duty to inform is recognised by the U.K's
General Medical Council, which says "You must protect patients when you believe that a
colleague's conduct, performance or health is a threat to them ... if necessary, you must
tell someone from the employing authority or from a regulatory body ... The safety of
patients must come first at all times." See DUTIES OF A DOCTOR: GOOD MEDICAL PRACTICE paras.18, 19 (1995); and ConsultantFound Guilty for Failingto Act on a Colleague, 308
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1 (1994).
28. See Powell v Boldaz (Court of Appeal, 1997. Unreported. Negligence was admitted and the parents received compensation for the psychiatric damage they suffered as a
consequence of their son's death. However, they failed in their action to obtain a full
account of the precise chain of events which led to his death.)
29. See in relation to the drug beta interferon, T. Walley & S. Barton, A Purchaser
Perspective of Managing New Drugs: Interferon Beta as a Case Study, 311 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 796 (1995). See also P. Jacobsen & C. John Rosenquist, The Introductionof

Low-Osmolar Contrast Agents in Radiology: Medical, Economic, Legal and Public Policy
Issues, 260 JAMA 1586 (1988).
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to offer his patient marginally beneficial treatment?3"
Doctors have to consider matters that lie uncomfortably within the
traditional ideal of the Hippocratic oath because "the weighing of...
benefits and risks with financial costs is not simply a medical decision but
also a social judgment about the value of spending additional resources to
lower health risks."'" Nevertheless, we accept that it is proper to fund
doctorm in a manner that requires them to manage their resources prudently and to make hard choices amongst patients, based in part on considerations of social policy. It would be entirely inconsistent to demand
at the same time a commitment to each patient of such a nature as would
usually exhaust the funds made available before the end of the financial
year. "'Where limits are a fact of life, physician selflessness cannot directly translate into an institutional response."3 After all, we are also
patients when we are well. We trust doctors to treat us not only today,
but to manage their resources in a way that will enable them to offer
reasonable care tomorrow. Doctors, then, to some extent must become
managers. But the purpose of their doing so is only to promote the
clinical benefit of all of their patients. It is only within this framework,
however, that the notion of fiduciary duty has significance.3 3
Reasoning of this nature is common within a framework of fiduciary
duty, the origin of which lies in equity. By analogy, the fiduciary duty of
a trustee to beneficiaries is to be "impartial in the execution of his trust,
and not exercise his powers so as to confer an advantage on one benefici30. See C. Newdick, Resource Allocation in the NHS 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 291, 310-16
(1997); Hall & Anderson, supra note 2, at 1640-41; and Mariner, supra note 2, at 1516. The
American Medical Association considers that "allocation decisions should be determined
not by physicians at the bedside but according to guidelines established at a higher policy
making level." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 8, at 332.
31. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 8, at 331. "The physician
knows that there are other patients who have subscribed to the managed care plan and
who are owed a certain level of health care." Id. at 332.

32. Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, 19
AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 52 (1993). See also "the altruism of the physician's concern for the
individual patient must be extended to the class of potential patients. The good of the
isolated doctor-patient relationship must be evaluated in the light of the good of all the
patients." Id. at 51.
33. To put the matter another way: "[flor ethics or law to insist that all beneficial
medical treatment must continue to be ordered regardless of the cost is to force patients to
purchase a brand of insurance they may no longer be able to afford." See Mark A. Hall, A
Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 515 (1997). For a discussion
of the role doctors already play in promoting public health, and an ethical case for their
considering issues of cost, see MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONSTHE LAW, ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 122-54 (1998).
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ary or class of beneficiary at the expenses of another., 3 4 To focus too
closely on the minority's interests within the group could be detrimental
to the majority and result in a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the
latter. Undoubtedly, the nature of the personal relationship between
doctor and patient is very different from the commercial environment
that exists between, for example, company directors and shareholders.
The point, however, is that the theory of fiduciary duty alone is insufficient to resolve the difficulties faced by doctors when demand for resources exceeds supply.
The essential principle of funding in the NHS, under the National
Health Service Act of 1977," 5 is capitation.36 We also accept, within the
1977 Act, the need for a substantial investment in preventive medicine,
which obviously reduces the resources available for the treatment of disease.3 7 It is improbable, therefore, that the Act was intended to give patients rights of access to every form of treatment no matter how
expensive or marginal its benefits, irrespective of the impact such a decision would have on others. On the contrary, the Secretary of State for
Health has a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that resources are
available to all patients throughout the year and that those who are well
today have access to services when they need them tomorrow. This suggests that reasonable schemes designed to facilitate the equitable distribution of health care resources throughout the year are both a sensible
and proper component of the powers available to the Secretary pursuant
to his duty under the 1977 Act to provide a "comprehensive" service.38
Increasingly, therefore, the question is not "whether" but "how" health
care resources ought to be managed. The central issue is less about substantive rights of access, and more about the institutional and procedural
settings in which decisions occur. This is the subject of the following section, with particular reference to the NHS.
34. UNDERHILL AND HAYTON'S LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 500 (1995). "[Tlhe
obligation of a trustee is to administer the trust impartially or fairly, having regard to the
different interests of the beneficiaries." Id. at 502. See also In re W.& M. Roith Ltd. [1967]
1 WLR 432. By analogy, doctors may breach their duty of confidentiality to patients in
order to protect others. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d

334 (Cal. 1976); and W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835.
35. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT 1977 (Eng.).
36. See HCHS REVENUE RESOURCE ALLOCATION: WEIGHTED CAPITATION
FORMULA (NHSE, 1994); and A FORMULA FOR DISTRIBUTING NHS REVENUES BASED ON
SMALL AREA USE OF HOSPITAL BEDS (University of York, 1994).
37. See THE HEALTH OF THE NATION, infra note 56.
38. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT 1977, § 3 (Eng.), discussed in NEWDICK, supra
note 3, at ch.4.
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II.

THE

ORGANISATION OF HEALTH CARE:

THE

EXPERIMENTS IN

NHS

Over the past ten years, the NHS has undergone, and continues to undergo, significant change. This section discusses the relevant strengths
and weaknesses of each stage of development in order to highlight both
the systems that appear to be most attractive and the procedural safeguards that are necessary to preserve a proper balance between the
"macro" and "micro" interests in the resources debate. The periods between 1948-91, 1991-97, and 1997 forward are discussed.
A.

Top-Down Management: 1948-91

The salient feature of the organisation of the NHS that emerged in
1948 was its dual commitment to a "comprehensive" health service and
the preservation of clinical freedom. The White Paper of 1944, on which
the system was based, declared the Government's intention that:
[E]very man and woman and child can rely on getting all the
advice and treatment and care which they need in matters of
personal health; that what they get shall be the best medical and
other facilities available; that their getting these shall not depend on whether they can pay for them, or on any other factor
irrelevant to the real need-the real need being to bring the
country's full resources to bear upon reducing ill-health and promoting good health in all its citizens.3 9
In addition, "[o]rganisation is needed to ensure that the service is there, is
there for all, and that it is a good service; but organisation must be seen as
the means, and never for one moment as the end."4 ° Allocations were
made, as they are today, on the basis of the profile of the relevant population, having regard to its number, average age, morbidity, and mortality." The system applied to health authorities responsible for providing
39. .ANATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, Cmd. 6502 (1944) at 5. The passage in the text
suggests a hope that the incidence of ill-health in society would decrease, and so the commitment to NHS resources would be finite. The error of this expectation was exposed in
THE REORT OF THE COMMITTEE INTO THE COSTS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

1956, Crand. 9663, para.95:
The growth of medical knowledge adds continually to the number and expense of
patients' treatments and, by prolonging life, also increases the incidence of slowkilling diseases... There is no reason at present to suppose that the demands on
the service will be reduced ... so as to stabilise (still less reduce) [the] total cost in
terms of finance and the absorption of resources.
40. Id. at 8.
41. See supra note 36.
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hospitals and secondary care, and also primary care general practitioners
("GPs") working in the community.4 2
However, this theory of the "command economy" model of the NHS
was entirely contradicted by the practice. The White Paper of 1944 also
promised "[f]reedom for the doctor to pursue his professional methods in
his own individual way, and not to be subject to outside clinical interference."4 3 Not surprisingly, given this commitment and the status and prestige of the medical profession, the culture of "professional perfectionism"
dominated the health service, in which doctors were permitted to manage
patients in the ways they considered most appropriate, without interference from others.4 4 This position of preeminence did not stop at the bedside. In the absence of health economists to advise managers as to the
most effective means of allocating resources between and within health
authorities, this function also tended to be most heavily influenced by the
medical profession.4 5
Unsurprisingly, this system of allocation exerted considerable upward
pressure on resources that managers found extremely difficult to influence. The dominance of the medical profession in decisions to purchase
facilities, particularly in the absence of information as to the costs of doing so, was capable of leading to overcapacity in some areas and undercapacity in others. The manner in which lump sums were allocated to
health authorities contained very little room for incentives that could act
as inducements to achieve targets. Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of
successive Secretaries of State for Health to adjust the ways in which resources were distributed, the system, together with the complaints that
surrounded it, proved very resistant to change.46
In 1985, this system of allocating resources was criticised by an American commentator with experience of the potential benefits offered by
competition in health care.47 He observed that, in the absence of incen42. GPs have worked almost exclusively as independent contractors and not as consultants. See NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT 1977, § 29(4) (Eng.). However, for the first
time, under the NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (PRIMARY CARE) ACT 1997, §2, GPs may be
engaged as employees. Whether this further compromises the independence of the GP has
yet to be assessed.
43. A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 39, at para.47.
44. RUDOLPH KLEIN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE N.H.S. 33 (3rd ed. 1995).
45. Id. at 125. STEPHEN HARRISON ET AL., JUST MANAGING: POWER AND CULTURE
IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 101-103 (1992); and BILL NEW & JULIAN LE GRAND,
RATIONING IN THE N.H.S.-PRNCIPLES AND PRAGMATISM 5-10 (1996).

46.

KLEIN, supra note 44, at 67. "The captain shouted his orders: the crew went on as

before."

47.

ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
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tives to improve standards, or introduce change, the formula for allocating resources was blind to those hospitals that were able to achieve the
most with least. Equally, it continued to fund hospitals that made less
productive use of the funds allocated to them without any means of encouraging an improvement in standards. He labelled this the "efficiency
trap.""a During this time there were a number of distressing stories in
which needy patients could not be offered care, and in which the courts
had found themselves unable to provide a remedy for the patients concerned.49 In this environment, in which there was considerable criticism
of failares of management in health authorities, the government announced its intention to reform the entire system of funding the NHS. It
was persuaded by the argument favouring the introduction of managed
competition into the NHS and committed itself to reforming the system
accordingly, whilst retaining the fundamental principles of access and
equality on which the system was founded.
B.

Incentives in the Internal Market: 1991-97

The reforms to the NHS were introduced by the National Health Service arid Community Care Act of 1990. It introduced an "internal market" inato the NHS by separating the functions of purchasing and
providing the health service bodies. Until 1999, the major purchasers of
health care will be health authorities and GP fundholders 5 0 -the major
providers are, and will remain, NHS hospitals.5 1 Resources are allocated
to purchasers who, in principle, are free to purchase from those hospitals
that give the best value for the money; for example, by offering the most
competitive prices, achieving the highest standards of patient care, and
meeting the various targets agreed to with the other party. These agreements are contained in "NHS contracts"5 2 that do not have the force of
contracts at common law, but are subject to internal regulations, which
HEALTH SERVICE-AN AMERICAN LOOKS AT INCENTIVES To EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH

SERVICES MANAGEMENT IN THE UK

(1985).

48. I. at 38-42.
49. NEWDICK, supra note 3, at ch.2.
50. GP fundholders are created by §§ 14-17, NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT 1990.
About 50% of all general practitioners are fundholders. The remainder have their costs
met directly by the health authority, but are subject to greater supervisory control. See, e.g.,
§ 18 of the NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE Acr 1990. The system will be reformed in April
1999. See WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED, infra note 68, at ch.3.
51. See NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND COMMUNITY CARE ACT 1990, § 4(1). See
generally NEWDICK, supra note 3, at 63; and Newdick, supra note 30, at 295.
52. *NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND COMMUNITY CARE ACT 1990, § 4(1). "'NHS
contract' means an arrangement under which one health service body ('the acquirer') ar-
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give them considerable influence when disputes arise between the parties.5 3 The incentives on each of the purchasers are different.
1.

Health Authorities

In the U.K., everyone has, and will continue to have, guaranteed access
to health care. Health authorities are subject to a statutory duty "to arrange ... with medical practitioners to provide personal medical services
for all persons in the locality who wish to take advantage of the arrangements.",54 As purchasers, health authorities are funded on the basis of the
capitation formula. They are subject to a number of policy directives
from the NHS Executive. Thus, annual priorities and planning "guidance" set a general framework for health authorities to follow. This policy is notoriously imprecise, however, 55 and is usually more concerned
with the manner in which the system functions than the achievement of
particular goals. More specific are the targets established in The Health
of the Nation,56 in which distinct areas of accidents and illness are identified and for which precise percentage reductions in mortality and morbidity are established as goals. In addition, the Patient's Charter57 gives
specific undertakings as to, inter alia, the maximum waiting times for
treatment, rights of confidentiality, access to records, and the right to be
consulted in decisions as to suitable treatment. Again, however, the
Charter has no legal force. Instead, it acts to encourage health service
managers rather than provide a guarantee of standards.
Health authorities occupy an unenviable position in the NHS. They
ranges for the provision to it by another health service body ('the provider') of goods and
services which it reasonably requires for the purposes of its functions."
53. Id. at § 4(3).
54. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT 1977, § 29 (Eng.). See also the National Health
Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, S.I, 1992, No.635, for a more detailed account of the respective duties of health authorities and general practitioners.

55. In the form of annual priorities and planning guidance, see e.g. PRIORITIES

AND

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE NHS: 1996/97 (NHS Executive, 1995), which introduces
itself as follows: "The purpose of the NHS is to secure through the resources available the
greatest possible improvement to the physical and mental health of the people.., a service
available to all on the basis of clinical need. In seeking to achieve this purpose the NHS, as
a public service, aims to judge its results under three headings [1] equity.. . , efficiency ....
responsiveness."
56. See THE HEALTH OF THE NATION (Department of Health, 1992). The specific areas of accidents and illness are coronary heart disease, cancer, mental illness, HIV/AIDS
and sexual health, and accidents. Limited progress has been made toward some of the
targets; others are resistant to change. See HEALTH OF THE NATION: A PROGRESS REPORT (House of Commons Paper 85, Session 1996/97, 1997).
57. PATINr's CHARTER, Department of Health, 1991.
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must make hard decisions regarding resources by entering large-scale
NHS contracts with NHS trust hospitals. The guidance, as we have seen,
is largely unspecific as to the medicines, treatments, tests, and procedures
that should be excluded from the framework of the NHS, so it is the executive officers of health authorities who carry the burden of balancing
their budgets from year to year.58 How can this duty be squared with the
promise of the Patient'sCharterthat every citizen has the right "to receive
59
health care on the basis of clinical need, regardless of ability to pay"?
The government refuses to recommend a list of treatments that should be
excluded from this NHS provision. It believes that such a list could never
be expressed in absolute terms and would have to allow clinical discretion
to admit exceptional cases-in which case, the problem would not be resolved. Alternatively, the list would have to be so precise that "[t]here
would be a real risk of taking decisions out of the hands of doctors." 60 In
these circumstances, it is true that managers have acquired a much louder
voice :in the debate about the ways in which resources should be allocated. However, comparing the patterns of allocations before and after
the introduction of the internal market, there has been no major change
in purchasing behaviour.6 1
2.

GP Fundholders

A more potent system of incentives exists for GP fundholders. Before
discus;ing fundholding in particular, however, we should remind ourselves that around one-half of all GPs in England and Wales are not
fundholding GPs and that all GPs, whether fundholders or not, remain
subject to the statutory regulations by which they commit themselves to
58. As they are obliged to do under the

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

Act 1977, ch.30

(Eng.). Section 97A of the 1977 Act provides "[i]t is the duty of every... Health Authority, in respect of each financial year, so to perform their functions as to secure that the
expenditure attributable to the performance by them of their functions in that year. ; .does
not exceed [its income]."
59. PATIENT'S CHARTER, supra note 57, at 8.
60. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE FIRST REPORT FROM THE HEALTH COMMITTEE,
Cmnd.2826, para.7 (1995). For a similar view, see Rudolph Klein, Can We Restrict the
Health Care Menu, 27 HEALTH POLICY 103, 112 (1994); and Rudolph Klein, Defining a
Package, of HealthcareServices the NHS is Responsible for-The Case Against, 314 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 506, 529 (1997). But see also Bill New, Defining a Package of Healthcare Services the NHS is Responsible For-The Case For, 314 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL
503, 50; (1997).
61. See SHARON REDMAYNE, SMALL STEPS, BIG GOALS-PURCHASING POLICIES IN
THE N.H.S. (1996), for an authoritative account of the evolution of policy since the intro-

duction of the 1990 reforms to the NHS.
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providing services with the NHS. 6 2 These regulations, known as the
"Terms of Service," impose many rights and duties on health authorities
and doctors,6 3 but they do not specifically address the question of scarce
resources. In one sense, however, they confirm the government's commitment expressed in the Patient's Charter that patient care should depend on the criterion of need alone. Thus, paragraph 43 provides that "a
doctor shall order any drugs or appliances which are needed for the treatment of any patient to whom he is providing treatment under these terms
of service." 64 The precise nature of this statutory duty has never been
tested in litigation. According to one view, it imposes an absolute obligation to respond to a patient's "need" without reference to other considerations, such as cost and the competing demands of others. According to
another, the duty has to be considered to be relative to the resources
made available to the NHS and, therefore, confers no absolute rights on
doctors or their patients.6 5
This is the background against which one must consider the particular
position of GP fundholders. Statutory regulations permit fundholders to
accumulate savings from their funds over a period of four years. These
savings do not belong to the doctors themselves. They may only be used
for purposes approved by the health authority and "for the benefit of the
patients of the members of practice and... represent value for money, '"66
62. See NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE Acr 1977, §
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND COMMUNITY CARE

29, ch.30 (Eng.) as amended by the
ACT 1990, § 2(1) and the National
Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, S.I. 1992, No.635, which imposes on health authorities a duty to arrange with GPs primary care medical services for all
persons in their area.
63. The regulations are probably quasi-contractual in nature. See Roy v Kensington
and Chelsea FPC [1992] 1 All ER 705, 709. Regulations of this nature were first introduced
with the creation of the NHS in 1946. See generally, NEWDICK, supra note 3, at ch.4, 118.
64. National Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, S.I. 1992,
No.635, sched.2. para.43.
65. Precisely this difference of opinion was expressed in the analogous case of R v
Gloucestershire C.C., ex pa Barry [1997] 1 All ER 1, which concerned the meaning of the
word "need" in the context of a different social welfare statute. A majority of the House of
Lords considered the local authority's duty to respond to a person's "need" to be variable,
and relative to the resources made available. In doing so they differed from the judges of
the Court of Appeal ([1996] 4 All ER 421, 422), who considered the word to impose an
absolute duty, dependent only on the condition of the individual concerned. See also R v
Sefton BC, ex p Help the aged [1997] 4 All ER 532.
66. National Health Service (Fund-holding Practices) Regulations 1996, S.1. 1996,
No.706, reg.25(3); and GP Fundholding-Useof Savings, Health Service Guidelines (95)46
(NHS Executive, 1995). "Health Service Guidelines ("HSG")" are publications by which
the NHS Executive communicates with health authorities and doctors who operate the
system. Another method is by "Executive Letters ("EL")." Neither HSGs nor ELs consti-
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and "unjustified" overspending in one financial year may result in the
subtraction of sums from future year's allocations.67 Clearly, this incentive may give rise to suspicion amongst patients that their clinical interests are in conflict with their doctor's financial interest. Equally,
fundholders may not derive direct personal benefits from their savings,
which must be used for the purpose of improving the services available
for patients. The evidence as to the effects of these incentives on clinical
practice is inconclusive.6 8
C. Bottom-Up Management 1997 On
The Labour Government doubts the benefits of the internal market for
health, and has committed itself to reforming it. 69 In theory, when markets are in equilibrium, purchasers will be able to impose sufficient pressure on hospitals to guarantee a broad cross-section of services at
reasonable prices so that patients can be assured of proper access to secondary care. But the market for health care is often characterised by
ignorance on the part of both patients and doctors as to the standards of
clinical outcomes achieved by hospitals.7" Consequently, the forces that
favour best value for money are less effective than elsewhere. In any
case, the prospect, and the consequences, of an NHS hospital simply going out of business for failing to remain solvent has health and political
implications vastly different from a commercial business facing the same
prospect. 71 In addition, markets are less effective in the service of those
with uncommon illnesses for which extensive investment in manpower
and other resources is unjustified. Here, cooperation, not competition,
between providers is essential in order for single centres of excellence to
tute "lE.w," but they have considerable impact on the manner in which the NHS organises
and manages itself. NEWDICK, supra note 3, at 190-93.
67. See Changing the Internal Market, Executive Letter (97)33 (NHS Executive, annex
B, 1997).
68. See H. Glennerster & M. Matsanganis et al., GP Fundholding: Wild Card or Winning Hand?, in R. ROBINSON & J. LE GRAND, EVALUATING THE HEALTH SERVICE REFORMS ch.4 (1994). One study found no evidence of fundholders making unwarranted
savings in order to accumulate savings, see Effect of the NHS Reforms on General Practitioner Referral Patterns306 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 433, 437 (1993). The Audit Commissior, is concerned that fundholders who invest savings in their premises improve its

overall value. When they leave the practice, therefore, and extract their share in the equity,
there are direct financial advantages to the doctor. See WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED-A
STUDY OF GP FUNDHOLDERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 78 (1996).
69. See THE NEW NHS, infra note 75, at ch.2.
70. See NEWDICK, supra note 3, at 43-59.
71. JOHN APPLEBY, DEVELOPING CoNTRAcrs-A NATIONAL SURVEY (1994).
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become the focus of treatment of sufficient numbers of patients to remain
effective.72 Also, the necessity for NHS trust hospitals to negotiate NHS
contracts with local purchasers carries its own transaction costs of, negotiation, drafting, supervision, invoicing, and dispute resolution, particularly
when many GP fundholders are involved in the process. The new government considers that the costs of process are not justified by its benefits.7 3
Perhaps most sensitive of all in the internal market of the NHS, however, is the entirely predictable feature that encouraged fundholding doctors to bargain more successfully with NHS trust hospitals and hence
enable their patients to be seen and treated more quickly than those of
non-fundholders. Their success arose from the fact that they could persuade NHS hospital trusts to create separate waiting lists for the patients
of fundholders. The incentive for doing so was that the hospital needed
the additional revenue, which fundholders could provide. Thus, the patients of non-fundholding GPs often found that they had to wait longer
for treatment than those of fundholders. This led to the allegation that a
"two-tier" system had developed, which undermined the promise that patients would be treated equally on the basis of need." For this to be
perceived as a disadvantage in the U.K. illuminates an underlying preference for overall equity in the system over piecemeal efficiency.
With these factors in mind, the Labour Party proposes to preserve the
purchaser/provider split whilst abolishing the internal market 75 and the
practice of fundholding. Beginning in 1999, health authorities will no
72. This was found to be the case, in particular, with respect to the treatment of cystic
fibrosis and neonatal intensive care. See CLINICAL SERVICES ADVISORY GROUP, CYSTIC
FIBROSIS (HMSO, 1993); and NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE (HMSO, 1993).
73. See THE NEW NHS, infra note 75, at ch.2. Transaction costs are notoriously difficult to quantify. See WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED, supra note 68, at paras.69-75. See also
in the United States, David Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhander, Cost Without BenefitAdministrative Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441, 442-44 (1986); David
Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhander, The DeterioratingAdministrative Efficiency of the U.S.
Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1256-57 (1991); and Donald Redelmeier
& Victor Fuchs, Hospital Expenditures in the United States and Canada, 328 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 772, 776-77 (1993).
74. See NEWDICK, supra note 3, at 56.
75. See THE NEW NHS-MODERN, DEPENDABLE ch.2 (1997). One explanation for
the apparent contradiction in such an idea is as follows:

There is no inherent connection between a purchaser/provider system and the
existence of competition ... the main purpose of the purchaser/provider split ...
is to ensure accountability on the part of providers to purchasers and this does not
in itself imply that there should be competition between providers for the re-

sources controlled by purchasers. Put another way, the purchaser/provider system
is justified not on the basis of economic theories which advocate the primacy of
markets but in terms of the organisational politics of health care.
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longer have to approve individual NHS contracts with NHS trusts. They
will continue to be funded on the capitation basis from the NHS Executive. The health authorities' duty will be to assess the needs of their local
populaitions and suggest longer-term strategic "health improvement
plans" with "primary care groups" and NHS trusts. They will allocate
resources to the former, and hold them accountable for their performance. Responsibility for purchasing health care will rest with each primary care group, which will represent around 100,000 patients.
Repre:sentatives of the group will allocate resources to individual doctor's
practices on behalf of patients in the area. Decisions as to the nature and
quantity of services to be provided will be made by clinicians within the
agreed strategy, so as to balance clinical and economic needs within the
system. 76 A market of sorts will continue to operate, because primary
care groups will preserve the freedom to choose between different hospital providers. The difference will be that the "service agreements" between primary care groups and NHS trusts will include more
sophisticated mechanisms for resolving disputes, with the assistance of
the NHS Executive if need be, so that cooperation is encouraged and the
risk of destabilising movements of resources reduced.
Abandoning the transaction costs associated with NHS contracts may
save a considerable sum of money. On the other hand, primary care doctors, rather than managers, will now be responsible for ensuring that
targets are met and, for some, this will introduce a new dimension to their
practice, more familiar to those practising in HMOs in the United States.
In addition, the "two-tierism," which characterised fundholding, may now
persist on a larger scale. The difference may now arise between different
health authorities, some of which agree that health improvement plans
should include certain benefits. Equally, local differences should reflect
the differing priorities of different patient groups. It would clearly be erroneous to imagine that when the new system is introduced in 1999, the
problems associated with scarce resources will disappear.
III.

SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

The suggestion that the traditional Hippocratic commitment to individual patients has to be modified to embrace a more institutional approach
CHRIS 'HAM, PUBLIC, PRIVATE, OR COMMUNITY-WHAT

NEXT FOR THE

NHS? 27-28

(1996).
76. Services for specialist groups will be undertaken by larger commissioning groups.
See THE NEW NHS, supra note 75, at para.7.23.
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to the concept of "rights" is controversial. Once the notion of individual
rights is diluted, what substantive entitlement to health care is left?
Surely, if patients must accept that their claims may have to give way to
public interests, we ought to be perfectly clear as to the principles on
which such a decision is to be based. Otherwise, the position of the individual is entirely precarious, always subject to some higher, unspecific,
but superior claim. History has taught us to be extremely wary of any
such theory.77 Nevertheless, that exactly represents our present predicament in health care, in which disagreement as to priorities persists. What
arguments, therefore, are available as a foundation upon which further
debate may take place? The following sections discuss procedural fairness, independent appeals procedures, and disclosure and regulation of
incentives.
A.

ProceduralFairness

One of the most unsatisfactory cases ever to have emanated from the
Court of Appeal in England is that of ex parte Collier,7 8 in which a fouryear-old boy was denied surgery to repair a hole in his heart. His responsible doctor had placed him at the top of the list of clinical priorities, yet
with the patient's condition steadily deteriorating, the operation he required was cancelled time and again because suitable facilities could not
be provided. His father made an application to the court for a declaration that the operation should be performed, but the court refused to
intervene. It said "[t]his court is in no position to judge the allocation of
resources by this particular health authority. 7 9 The case is unsettling because neither the applicant nor the court appeared to know how, or why,
facilities could not be made available for this undeniably urgent operation. On any Hippocratic assessment of the case, its merits could hardly
have been greater: the case was urgent, surgery was life-saving and wellunderstood, and the prospects of success were good. How could any reasonable system of priorities sensibly have abandoned such a deserving
case?
We should not be surprised that patients, particularly those in managed
care systems, cannot be guaranteed all available care, irrespective of its
77. See, e.g.,

ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY

ch.2 (1980); and

VEATCH,

supra note 22, at 67. For a rather chilling example of where the debate may lead, see John
Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die?, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 27, 34 (1997).

78. R v Central Birmingham AHA, ex p Collier, unreported, CA, 1988, available on
LEXIS (ENGGEN file).
79. Id. at *2.
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cost and likely benefit. Equally, however, if the system of allocation is
forced to aggregate claims, patients require the reassurance that it operates in ways that are reasonable and defensible. There has been some
indication of support for such a principle from a recent decision in the
U.K. Significantly, in ex parte Fisher,8 ° the High Court overturned the
refusal of a health authority to make additional funding available for the
new drug beta interferon, designed to benefit some patients with multiple
sclerosis. The basis of the judgment was not that the refusal to fund the
drug was unlawful, but that the reasons for its decision failed to give
proper consideration to a relevant factor and was irrational. The relevant
consideration was an executive letter 8 ' published by the Medical Director
of the NHS Executive recommending that "[plurchasing authorities...
develop and implement a prescribing approach for beta interferon."'8 2
Although the circular amounted to no more than guidance, and did not
have the force of law, it nevertheless imposed a duty on the health authority to take it into consideration. "The respondents had to have regard to ...national policy. They are not obliged to follow the policy, but
if they decided to depart from it, they had to give clear reasons for doing
so."' 83 The failure to give proper consideration to the policy recommended by the NHS Executive was held to be unreasonable and the deci84
sion was remanded to the health authority for reconsideration.
The issue of irrationality lay in the explanations offered by the health
authority for its failure to make the drug available. One reason for the
refusal was that the money could only be allocated on a "first come, first
served basis" and many patients would find at the end of the financial
year that the funds were exhausted and that this would be unfair. Of this
reason the judge said:
When deciding whether to prescribe treatment to a patient a clinician has to have regard to many factors including the rescurces available for that treatment and the needs of and likely
benefit to that patient as compared with other patients who are
80. R v North Derbyshire HA, ex p Fisher 11997] 8 Med.L.R. 327. See also Christopher
A. Ludlum et al., Treatmentfor Haemophilia by Postcode, 314 BRISH MEDICAL JOURNAL
749 (1997), criticising the unfairness of patients with identical needs being subject to differing decisions of access by health authorities responsible for their care, by reason of their
place of residence.
81. See New Drugs for Multiple Sclerosis, Executive Letter (95)97 (NHS Executive,
1995).
82. Id. at para.2.
83. R v North Derbyshire HA, ex p Fisher [1997] 8 Med.L.R. 336.
84. After the decision, the health authority decided to make the drug available and
reversed its previous policy.
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likely to be suitable. It is absurd to suppose that before any
patient is prescribed any expensive treatment a survey must be
made of all patients who are, or might be, in need of the same
treatment in the area. I do not accept that this
was a rational
85
justification for not releasing additional funds.
Ex parte Fisher clearly makes no contribution to the debate about substantive rights of access to NHS resources, or the problems presented by
scarce resources. Its importance lies in its affirmation of rights to procedural fairness. Nevertheless, in the U.K. we are, as yet, very far from a
general principle that obliges purchasers and providers of health care to
explain to patients the reasons for the action, or inactions. On the other
hand, once health authorities engage in a process of explanation, which
they are increasingly pressed to do, their reasons must be candid, consistent, and cogent in order to withstand the court's review. The reassurance that the courts will scrutinize health authority decisions to exclude
treatments from public provision is most valuable.
B.

Independent Appeals Procedure

Ex parte Fisher concerned the effective denial of treatment to a group
of patients suffering from multiple sclerosis. Should its reasoning be applied to individual patients in the same way? Short of formal judicial review, should health "insurers" (including health authorities within the
NHS) provide an internal, informal mechanism by which individuals may
challenge decisions to deny them certain medical treatment? This recommendation has been made for members of health maintenance organisations in the United States.86 Such a system, it is said, should be quick,
easy to use, and fair. Patients should be able to obtain a second opinion
within hours, and in cases of denial of urgent treatment, an independent
internal appeals process within forty-eight hours. Representation for the
patient will be required, paid for by the health insurer, perhaps funded by
an increase in the licensing fees imposed on those engaged in the business
of health care. Such a procedure applied to a case such as ex parte Collier
85. R v North Derbyshire HA, ex p Fisher [1997] 8 Med.L.R. 337.
86. George J. Annas, Patient's Rights in Managed Care-Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 337
NEW ENG. J. MED. 210, 214 (1997), discussing the case of Grijalva v. Shalala 946 F.Supp
747 (D. Ariz. 1996). See also E.D. Kinney, ProceduralProtectionsfor Patientsin Capitated
Health Plans,22 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1996); and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 332
(1995). "It is also critical for managed care plans to have a well-structured appeals process
through which physicians and patients can challenge the denial of a particular diagnostic
test or therapeutic procedure."
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offers an attractive solution; indeed, the very existence of the procedure,
together with its need for cogent reasons, would probably have prevented
such a denial of care from ever having occurred in this case.
Equally, there is a difficulty with the extent of this proposal. It seeks to
utilise procedures that are natural in the courtroom where, to a greater or
lesser extent, the court endeavours to discover established principles of
law sui.table for the resolution of disputes. In health care, however, we
have no comparable system of accepted principles on which issues of resource allocation can be resolved. In the absence of agreement, on what
basis could such a tribunal conduct its enquiry?87 If the proposal is made
less a ;earch for right answers, and more for public reassurance, this is
certainly desirable. But it may be less satisfactory for those who feel that
the allocation process would be distorted by tending to favour those who
complain. And if it encourages complaints from every dissatisfied patient, we ought to be sensitive to the cost of the exercise and the extent to
which it would divert resources away from caring for others. In one
sense, an internal review mechanism introduces precisely the problem of
resource allocation that managed care and the aggregation of "rights"
seeks to avoid. In an environment, such as the United States, in which
health care is provided under numerous contracts, which are far from
similar, and in which the market encourages both doctors and patients to
review their entitlements regularly with a view to change, the predominance of the notion of private rights and disputes clearly has great significance. By contrast, in the U.K., the law of contract plays no part in
decisions as to one's right of access to care within the NHS. Thus, subtle
matter:s as to the proper interpretation to be given to contractual phrases
such as "necessary," "appropriate," and "not experimental" care 88 do not
arise. Instead, the NHS has introduced uniform internal complaint procedures intended to improve accountability to patients, both at the primary and secondary care level.89 On the other hand, exceptional cases
87. See generally David Hadorn, Emerging Parallelsin the American Health Care and
Legal-JudicialSystems 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 73 (1992); and Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer
Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposals, and the Trade-offs 32 Hous. L.
REV.

1319 (1996).

88. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 2, at 1640-41; and Mariner, supra note 2, at 1516.
89. The system is governed by a number of statutory and non-statutory measures. For
complaints against GPs, see the National Health Service (General Medical Services)
Amendment Regulations 1996, S.I. 1996, No.702. For hospital complaints, see the HosPiTAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE ACT 1985; and DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NHS COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE (1996). See generally J. MONTGOMER-i, HEALTH SERVICES LAW ch.5 (1997).
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ought to have access to judicial review in the anticipation that, with the
more critical approach expressed in ex parte Fisher, a body of principles
will develop to guide sufficiently those whose task it is to make hard
choices of this nature.
C. Disclosure and Regulation of Incentives
In principle, we may agree that the various financial incentives offered
to doctors to treat, or not to treat, their patients are undesirable. They
may distort an impartial assessment of the patient's case and undermine
the special relationship between the parties.9 ° In practice, however, it is
extremely difficult to devise systems of remunerating doctors that exert
no influence on clinical decision making because "financial neutrality is
an ideal. No payment mechanism completely eliminates the influence of
payment on treatment."9 1 The payment of fees for each episode of care
may encourage overtreatment, particularly if doctors are rewarded for
referring patients to particular hospitals for care. By contrast, the imposition of penalties for exceeding capitation limits may incline doctors to
undertreat, particularly if the service as a whole is underfunded. Remember too, the irony that systems which encourage excess capacity may also
tend to undertreat patients.
For example, because [in the U.S.] we have too many mammography machines, each is underutilized. This doubles the cost
of each test. As a result, many women cannot afford screening.
Thus, because we have too many mammography machines, we
have too little breast cancer screening.9"
To some extent, therefore, we may have to live with incentives. How
should they be regulated? In the U.S., the case of Shea v. Esensten suggests that details of financial pressures, which inhibit treatment, should be
disclosed to patients.93 The patient was a member of a health maintenance organisation ("HMO"), which undertook to provide all medically
90. See generally MARC A.

RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS-PHYSICIANS

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, chs.3-4 (1993); and Steffie Woolhander & David Himmelstein,
Extreme Risk-The New Corporate Proposition for Physicians, 133 NEW ENG. J. MED.

1706 (1995).
91. Gordon D. Schiff et al., A Better-Quality Alternative- Single-Payer National
Health System Reform, 272 JAMA 803, 806 (1994).
92. Id. at 806. The authors note too that, as a result, surgeons may have insufficient
exposure to surgery to retain a desired level of expertise in their specialty, thus increasing
the risk of error.
93. Shea v Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir, 1997). A similar point is made by the

Supreme Court of California in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d
479, 483 (Cal. 1990), when the court says "a physician must disclose personal interests
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necessary care. Unknown to the patient, the contract between the doctor
and the HMO "created financial incentives that were designed to minimize referrals. Specifically, the primary care doctors were rewarded for
not making covered referrals to specialists, and were docked a portion of
their fees if they made too many."94 The patient's family had a history of
heart disease. The patient visited his doctor on a number of occasions
with chest pains, but the doctor advised the patient that consulting a cardiologist was unnecessary. The pains continued, the patient offered to
pay for the consultation himself, but the doctor offered the same reassurance. A few months later the patient died of heart failure. The plaintiff's
widow alleged that, had her husband known of these incentives, he would
have disregarded the doctor's advice and sought the advice of a specialist
at his own expense and would have avoided his heart attack. The court
reasoned as follows:
[A] financial incentive scheme put in place to influence a treating doctors' referral practices when the patient needs specialized
care is certainly a material piece of information. This kind of
paient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about treatment
options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self-serving financial considerations created by the
health insurance provider. We conclude Mr. Shea had the right
to know [the HMO] was offering financial incentives that could
have colored his doctor's medical judgment about the urgency
for a cardiac referral ...

[then] he could have made a fully in-

formed decision about whether to trust his doctor's recommendation that a cardiologist examination was unnecessary.9 5
How ex:tensive ought to be this duty of disclosure?9 6 A difficulty, which
has at least some judicial sympathy, is that the requirements of the language of "rights" in this context serves to increase the time doctors and
patient; spend simply talking. Obviously, talking is often essential to the
unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment."
94. Shea, 107 F.3d at 626-27.
95. I. at 628-29. See also by analogy the insurer's duty to an insured under a policy of
health insurance. In Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Company, 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C.
Cir. 1990', the Court of Appeals said "A fiduciary has a duty not only to inform a beneficiary of new and relevant information as it arises, but also to advise him of circumstances
that threaten interests relevant to the relationship," citing in support para.173 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, comment d (1959).
96. Ihe American Medical Association recommends that "physicians should disclose
all available treatment alternatives, regardless of cost, including those potentially beneficial
treatments that are not offered under the terms of the plan." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 8, at 332.
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creation of a meaningful and trusting relationship between them, but the
97
time spent doing so also impinges on the time available to treat others.
Thus, in Truman v. Thomas,9 8 a very extensive duty was imposed on the
doctor to disclose to the patient information concerning the dangers of
her refusal to have a cervical smear. The dissenting judgment, however,
pointed to the danger of assessing the merits of the case according to an
unqualified focus on the rights and duties of the parties before the court,
at the cost of those who are not litigants. It was argued that an overly
generous duty "will result in reduced care for others. Requiring physicians to spend a large portion of their time teaching medical science
before practising it will increase the cost of medical diagnosis-a cost ultimately paid for by an unwanting public." 99 To this duty of disclosure of
information about the risks of non-treatment, must we also include the
duty to disclose the existence of incentives?
A duty to explain to every patient the nature and degree of the incentives surrounding a particular clinical decision appears extreme. Certainly, incentives tend to diminish the trust and confidence that should
form the basis of the doctor-patient relationship. But an overemphasis
on regular and detailed disclosure of the details of such payments and
deductions would not necessarily enhance trust between them, indeed it
might have entirely the contrary effect. If we have to learn to live with
incentives, it is their capacity to distort clinical judgment that must be
addressed. A preferable solution is to introduce consistent and visible
systems that both regulate incentives and inform patients of their likely
impact on treatment decisions. 10 In the NHS, this objective is achievable
under the regulations governing the ways in which fundholding GPs (and
97. See Hall, supra note 33, at 511, advocating a system of "prior informed consent to
rationing" in which explanations of the principles on which resources are allocated should
be given by the insurer prior to patient enrolment. The duty to disclose information to
patients is more extensive in Canada (Reibl v Hughes [1980] 114 DLR (3d) 1), Australia
(Rogers v Whitaker [1992] 175 C.L.R. 479) and many of the state jurisdictions of America,
than in England and Wales (Sidaway v Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 AC 871). Recent
English authority, however, favours more extensive disclosure. See Smith v Tunbridge
Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 33.

98. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 910 (Cal. 1980).
99. Id. (dissenting opinion). Precisely this point has been made by the Court of Appeal in England in a case concerning access to health resources. See Re J (a minor) [1992]
4 All ER 614, 625. However, more recently in the House of Lords, Lord Browne-Wilkinson has said "it is not legitimate for a judge in reaching a view as to what is for the benefit
of the individual whose life is in issue to take into account the wider practical issues as to
allocation of limited financial resources." See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER
821,879.
100. See Hall, supra note 33, at 516-25.
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primary care groups after 1999) may use their savings, 10 1 and specific restrictions on incentives have recently been introduced with respect to
U.S. doctors who treat Medicare or Medicaid1" 2 patients. Open and consistent regulations of this nature would be a more understandable and
cost-effective means of reassuring patients that incentives are not imposing unacceptable distortions on clinical judgment. Such systems should
be designed to reassure patients that standards of care will be maintained 1" 3 and that incentives will be responsive to issues relating to quality and cost of care.'0 4
IV.

SOLIDARITY, TRUST, AND CONFIDENCE

Trust and confidence in health care systems are crucial. One of the
advantages of systems that promote unity of purpose and a sense of solidarity is the confidence they inspire, notwithstanding the difficult decisions that have to be made between competing demands for care. This is
impossible to quantify but is immensely important. It explains why, in
the U.K., the bargaining pressure available to fundholding GPs, which
enabled them to gain advantages for their own patients at the expense of
others, was unacceptable. The inevitable inequalities that arise from market competition, in which some providers perform better than others,
101. See generally, AN ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR GP FUNDHOLDING (NHS
Executive, 1995), which introduces principles of openness and candour in the way in which
fundholdors plan and provide services. Patients and health authorities should have access
to such plans. Principles of this nature could form the basis of more sophisticated regulation of incentives.
102. See David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to do Less: FinancialIncentives to

Limit Cate, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 162-64 (1996), favouring the use of modest incentives
for doctors. Massachusetts is considering a bill to establish an Office of Managed Care
Oversight and a principle that "[n]o provider contract ... shall the risk threshold of any
individual provider exceed 5% of the provider's annual payment from the health plan."
Bill 6/97 Re-draft, To Protect Consumers in Managed Care Plans in the Commonwealth,
title IV (1997). The American Medical Association considers that "[r]easonable limits
should be placed on the extent to which a physician's ordering of services can effect his or
her income. For example, quantitative financial incentives should be calculated on groups
of physicians rather than individual physicians." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
supra note 8, at 334.
103. For a more flexible view of standards, see John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity and the
Unitary Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991).
104. The U.K. Government proposes to introduce a number of new statutory institutions to irprove health care quality, including a National Institute for Clinical Excellence
and a Commission for Health Improvement. See THE NEW NHS, supra note 75, at para
7.6. On the need for patient involvement in the process, see Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer
Protectioti and Managed Care: The Need for Organised Consumers, 15 HEALTH AFFAIRS
110 (1996.).
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seems to be less desirable than the sense of fairness that a "level playing
field"' 1 5 promotes.
Clearly, this concern for equality is ethical rather than economic.
"What unites it with ethical considerations is its focus on integrative systems: on processes, transactions and institutions which promote an individual's sense of identity, participation and community and allow him
more freedom of choice for the expression of altruism and which, simultaneously, discourage a sense of individual alienation."106 Many European systems of health care endeavour to embrace this "sense," which for
convenience, is described as corresponding to the "Beveridge" or the
"Bismarck" models.'0 7 Under the Beveridge model, countries such as the
U.K., Sweden, Norway, Italy, and Spain commit, themselves to a system
under which health care is financed by the treasury from general taxation.
In Bismarck systems, adopted in countries like Germany, Holland,
France, and Belgium, health care is financed through compulsory social
insurance in which entitlements to care are based on standards and criteria agreed between the insurance providers and the government. In the
Netherlands, for example, a government report designed to assist the debate as to priorities in health care described the basis of this public
"ethic" as follows:
Solidarity is the awareness of a unity and a willingness to bear
the consequences of it. Unity indicates the presence of a group
of people with a common history and common convictions and
ideals. Group solidarity has played a prominent role in the history of health insurance. Solidarity can be voluntary, as when
people behave out of humanistic motives, or compulsory, as
when the government taxes the population to provide services
to all. Compulsory solidarity is a central theme in social
insurance. o8
105. Id. at annex B.
106. RICHARD TITMUSs, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP-FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY 224 (1971). The NHS is "[tihe most unsordid act of British social policy in the
twentieth century [which] has allowed sentiments of altruism and reciprocity to express
themselves; to be made explicit and identifiable in measurable patterns of behaviour by all
social groups and classes." Id. at 225.
107. See CHRIS HAM ED., HEALTH CARE REFORM-LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE ch.1 (1997); Jo LENEGHAN ED., HARD CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE: RIGHTS

AND RATIONING IN EUROPE (1997); and Brian Abel-Smith & Elias Mossialos, Cost Containment and Health Care Reform: A Study of the European Union, 28 HEALTH POLICY 89
(1994).
108. CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE 15 (Government Committee on Choices in Health
Care, Zoetermeer, The Netherlands, 1992). Social solidarity is also described as a "value,
whereby the costs of care are intentionally cross-subsidised from young to old, from rich to
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On this basis, the report found no difficulty in recommending, as a principle, that some types of care should not be provided within the Dutch
system of social insurance. Similarly, the final report of the Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission identifies the notions of human dignity,
need, and solidarity as principles on which questions of allocation should
be founded.1" 9 Both reports, therefore, commit themselves to excluding
some categories of care in order to provide a minimum guarantee to everyone. This reappraisal of the idea of rights and the recommendation that
they should be modified according to communitarian ethics is also gaining favour amongst social scientists elsewhere. 110 The serious difficulty
faced by these proposals, however, is their absence of precision as to entitlements. Notably, neither the Dutch nor the Swedish report was able to
say what type of care should be excluded from a comprehensive package
of benefits."' Does this make them worthless?
According to one view, the Dutch and Swedish packages serve no purpose and naively imagine that patients will agree to forego specific treatthe interest of some higher good." 12 Unless systems of health
ment iar
care and insurance can identify the categories of treatment to be excluded, then it is for each patient to look out for himself and to claim, as
of right, as much as possible." 3 On the other hand, in an environment in
poor and from the healthy to the sick, to ensure that all members of society receive the
care that they need." See R. B. SALTMAN & J. FIGUERAS, EUROPEAN HEALTH CARE REFORM-ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STRATEGIES 6 (1997).
109. PRIORIrIES IN HEALTH CARE 20 (Final Report of the Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission, 1995).
110. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE-COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1997). Similar ideas have also been expressed in the
health care context in MICHAEL GRODIN ED., META MEDICAL ETHICS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF BIOETHIcs 61-76 (1995).

111. The Dutch report recommended that in vitro fertilisation, homeopathic medicine,
and dental care for adults could be excluded, but that sports injuries and homes for elderly
people should be included. See CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 108, at 87-92. The
Swedish report recommended inclusion of in vitro fertilisation, but excluded growth hormone deficiency (shortness of stature). It also recommended the avoidance of waste by the
more effizient use of resources, a theme advocated by some as the most important element
in extencing health coverage. See PRIORITIES IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 121130. See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, The Oregon Experiment: Needless and Real Worries, in
M.A. STUOSBERG ET AL., RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN
AND BEYOND (1992).
112.

'he number of complaints from NHS patients continues to rise each year. See

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BEING HEARD: THE REPORT OF A REVIEW COMMITTEE ON
NHS COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 101-05 (1994).

113. Reasons for the dominance of the concept of "rights" in the United States are

considered by George Annas, The Dominanceof American Law (and Market Values) Over
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which there is a collective commitment to public health, there may be a
greater willingness to compromise demands that impose a disproportionate strain on resources. The nature and extent of the compromise will be
impossible to define and may change from time to time.
If we accept, as we must, that there is no such thing as a perfect system
of health care, that there is no "holy grail" of health care priorities, and
that clinical freedom does not exist in a vacuum, then we have to modify
our conception of the duties owed by doctors to patients. We should seek
to achieve an acceptable balance, between competing demands within
systems of care, that has the respect and trust of those it serves. No system of health care will inspire this sense of confidence if managerial priorities become the dominant factor in matters of resource allocation, in
which precisely those who need care the most find it the most difficult to
obtain insurance. 1 4 Thus, doctors must be at the centre of the debate
about priorities, sensitive to their duties to patients. Such a modification
of the Hippocratic commitment to individuals requires, at a minimum,
that the entire community has adequate access to care, that differentials
between different categories of patients are acceptable, and that the system of making choices is visible and accountable.' 5 These elements are
essential to any community interested in creating a system of public
health ethics.

American Bioethics, in

MICHAEL GRODIN ED., META MEDICAL ETHIcs: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 83-84 (1995).

114. See Robert Morgan & Beth Virnig et al., The Medicare-HMO Revolving DoorThe Healthy Go In and the Sick Go Out 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 169, 174 (1997).
115. See generally, Brennan, supra note 32, at 55-64. The NHS is beginning to grapple
with these issues. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Department of
Health, 1994); CODE OF PRACTICE AND OPENNESS (NHS Executive, 1995); and ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NHS (British Medical Association, 1994).

